# Wake – Round 5 vs. Towson HW (Aff)

## 1AC

#### Status quo waste siting is a form of radioactive colonialism. Native Americans have to contend with the worst waste, which saps them of an infrastructure to address dire problems.

Bullard and Johnson, Director of the Environmental Justice Resource Center and Assistant Professor of Sociology at Clark Atlanta University, ‘9

 (Robert D. and Glenn S., “Environmental Justice: Grassroots Activism and Its Impact on Public Policy Decision Making,” *Environmental Sociology: from Analysis to Action*, Second Edition, p.62-63, accessed 7-10-09, AJP)

There is a direct correlation between exploitation of land and exploitation of people. It should not be a surprise to anyone to discover that Native Americans have to contend with some of the worst pollution in the United States (Beasley, 1990b;Kay,1991;Taliman,1992;Tomsho,1990).Native American nations have become prime targets for waste trading (Angel,1992;Geddicks,1993).More than three dozen Indian reservations have been targeted for landfills, incinerators, and other waste facilities (Kay,1991).The vast majority of these waste proposals have been defeated by grassroots groups on the reservations. However, “radioactive colonialism” is alive and well (Churchill & LaDuke,1983). Radioactive colonialism operates in energy production (mining of uranium) and disposal of wastes on Indian lands. The legacy of institutional racism has left many sovereign Indian nations without an economic infrastructure to address poverty, unemployment, inadequate education and health care, and a host of other social problems. Some industry and governmental agencies have exploited the economic vulnerability of Indian nations. For example, of the 21 applicants for the DOE’s monitored retrievable storage (MRS) grants,16 were Indian tribes (Taliman,1992a). The 16 tribes lined up for $100,000 grants from the DOE to study the prospect of “temporarily” storing nuclear waste for a half century under its MRS program. It is the Native American tribes’ sovereign right to bid for the MRS proposals and other industries. However, there are clear ethical issues involved when the U.S. government contracts with Indian nations that lack the infrastructure to handle dangerous wastes in a safe and environmentally sound manner. Delegates at the Third Annual Indigenous Environmental Council Network Gathering (held in Cello Village, Oregon, on June 6,1992) adopted a resolution of “No nuclear waste on Indian lands.”

#### This is especially true surrounding Yucca Mountain. The discourse surrounding Yucca siting is racist as it valued technical arguments for storage over cultural arguments

Endres, Associate Professor of Communications at the University of Utah, ‘12

[Danielle, “Sacred Land or National Sacrifice Zone: The Role of Values in the Yucca Mountain Participation Process”, Process, Environmental Communication: A Journal of Nature and Culture, 6:3, 328-345, RSR]

Despite this progress, flaws remain in many currently used processes of participation (Depoe & Delicath, 2004). Although decision makers have adopted more dialogic participatory models of participation in some settings (e.g., Dietz & Stern, 2008), the NWPA participation process followed for Yucca Mountain remains an essentially technocratic Decide-Announce-Defend (DAD) model in which decisions are made by scientific and policy experts and then presented to the public for approval. Most DAD participation processes value scientific and technical arguments over social-, cultural-, and value-based arguments (e.g., Depoe & Delicath, 2004; Farrell & Goodnight, 1981; Fiorino, 1990; Katz & Miller, 1996; Toker, 2002; Waddell, 1990, 1996). Expanding upon these critiques of DAD models, I specifically examine the role for values in these models. Although scientific, cultural, and social dimensions of decision making are all influenced by values, technocratic decision makers often assume that scientific and technical arguments are value free, thus relegating values to the realm of the social and cultural dimensions that are already marginalized. Therefore, technocratic decision making automatically assumes one set of implicit values while excluding other competing values under the false assumption that science is value free. These flaws in DAD participation processes also apply in the more specific realm of decision making over nuclear technologies. The public sphere surrounding nuclear technologies is ‘‘constricted and degraded by technocratic domination’’ (Taylor, Kinsella, Depoe, & Metzler, 2007, p. 381). Stakeholder participation in nuclear issues is particularly problematic because of secrecy, discursive containment, and the perception that the highly technical nature of nuclear technologies is best handled by experts (e.g., Kinsella, 2001, 2005; Taylor, 1998; Taylor et al., 2007). Scientific and technical knowledge dictate the process with little attention paid to other relevant forms of expertise. In the case of Yucca Mountain, participation in the Yucca Mountain siting decision occurred in the form of comment periods held during both the EIS process (1996 2004) and site authorization decision (2001 2002). While the EIS comment period valued scientific and technical arguments over social and cultural arguments (Ratliff, 1997), the site authorization comment period explicitly called for only scientific and technical arguments (Endres, 2009a). The DOE explicitly framed the site authorization comment period as: (1) an opportunity for the DOE to educate ‘the public’ and (2) for ‘the public’ to comment on the scientific and technical arguments produced by Yucca Mountain Project scientists (DOE, 2002b, 2002c). The participation process created neither a role for non-technical arguments nor a role for the values underlying both technical and non-technical arguments. Yet, opponents and proponents still made value-based claims, which formed a significant stasis point in the controversy.

#### This discursive erasure of cultural and spiritual values attached to Yucca creates a nuclear sacrifice zone, exterminating Native lands and peoples

Kuletz, Prof. of American Studies @ U of Canterbury, 98

[Valerie, The Tainted Desert: Environmental Ruin in the American West, pg. 12-13, RSR]

In this Indian country two landscapes – Indian and nuclear – meet at nearly every point of the nuclear cycle, from uranium mining to weapons testing to the disposal of nuclear waste. For example: Nuclearism in this large region began in the early 1940s with the mining and milling of uranium ore largely on Navajo, Hopi, Pueblo and Ute Mountain Ute land in the Navajoan desert. This uranium fueled the atomic bomb developed at Los Alamos, located adjacent and near traditional Pueblo lands on the Pajarito Plateau of New Mexico. In 1945, the first testing of the atomic bomb occurred at Alamagordo (now White Sands), New Mexico, near the Mescalero Apache reservation. In the 1950s, ancestral lands of the Western Shoshone and Southern Paiute at the intersection of the Great Basin and Mojave deserts were seized by the federal government, in violation of the 1863 Treaty of Ruby Valley, for use as the nation’s testing fields for nuclear weapons (the Nevada Test Site) – an area where more nuclear bombs have been detonated than on any other single, similar size region on the globe. Today, the only above-ground, temporary nuclear waste storage facilities under consideration have been on the Nevada Test Site and the Mescalero Apache, Skull Valley Goshute, and Fort Mcdermitt Paiute-Shoshone reservations. The nation’s moderate-level nuclear waste storage, called WIPP (for Waste Isolation Pilot Project), is in the same general region as the Mescalero Apache reservation in the Chihuahuan desert. Radioactive waste from research at Los Alamos National Laboratory is now stored at “Area G”, which borders the San Ildefonso Pueblo and is near the Santa Clara Pueblo’s lands. Low-level nuclear waste is targeted for disposal in the Mojave Desert’s Ward Valley, home of the Fort Mojave Indians and the Chemehuevi of the Colorado River Indian tribes. Finally, the proposed premiere site for the nation’s high-level nuclear waste repository is Yucca Mountain – “holy land” to the Western Shoshone, Southern Paiute, and Owens Valley Paiute. The discursive map demonstrates how the development, testing, and waste storage of nuclear materials in the highly militarized landscapes of the western United States might be understood as a form of environmental racism. At the very least, it sets the stage for asking how land use, racism, power and internal colonialism intersect in this region. This mapping not only makes visible the millions of acres that were removed from access for weapons testing and development in the postwar years, it also reveals the peoples affected and displaced by these activities. Once revealed, the nuclear landscape can be perceived and experienced differently; it can be seen as one landscape superimposed upon another: a landscape of national sacrifice, an expendable landscape, over what many North American Indians understand as a geography of the sacred, a geography where spiritual and cultural life are woven directly into the landscape itself.

#### Moreover, the USFG uses tribal sovereignty against Natives, exploiting their control over the land to turn them into nuclear sacrifice zones

Kuletz, Prof. of American Studies @ U of Canterbury, 98

[Valerie, The Tainted Desert: Environmental Ruin in the American West, pg. 95-96, RSR]

When people say that nuclearism is the “price we pay for freedom”, they usually omit the fact that this price is paid by those with disproportionately less power. Though poor communities often pay the highest price, more privileged Americans are not exempt from some kind of “payment”. Indeed, given that we are contemplating materials that transgress the social demarcations of borders and boundaries, it sometimes seems superfluous to talk about maps at all. Admittedly, there is irony in mapping a nuclear sacrifice zone when nuclear pollution tends to make boundaries obsolete. Even so, as we have seen with the uranium mining district, as well as the nuclear testing ranges, identifiable zones of concentration of nuclear activity exist that are substantively different from other regions. Likewise, some regions and people are actively targeted for nuclear waste disposal. As Grace Thorpe, tribal judge and health commission for Sauk and Fox Nation of Oklahoma, put it: The U.S. government targeted Native Americans [for nuclear waste disposal] for several reasons: their lands are some of the most isolated in North America, they are some of the most impoverished and, consequently, most politically vulnerable and, perhaps most important, tribal sovereignty can be used to bypass state environmental laws. How ironic that, after centuries attempting to destroy it, the U.S. government is suddenly interested in promoting Native American sovereignty – just to dump its lethal garbage…[and] and serve as hosts for the nation’s nuclear garbage dump.” The only two potential national, deep-geologic, high-level, and military waste sites in the United States are on or near traditional Indian lands; all recent proposals for temporary nuclear waste storage sites are for Indian reservations; and the nation’s new premiere “low-level” nuclear dump site also borders native communities on traditional native lands. The U.S. government has offered (through the office of the U.S. Nuclear Negotiator) often destitute Native communities substantial sums of money to consider waste-storage possibilities. As noted by Indian environmental activist Winona LaDuke: Indian reservations, which constitute [only] four percent of US lands, hold vast supplies of uranium, coal and timber. These vast, isolated lands are also attractive to industries searching for disposal sites for nuclear waste. In the past four years, more than 100 separate proposals have been made by government and industry to dump waste on Indian lands. To date, Indians have received 16 of the 18 “nuclear waste research grants” issued by the US Department of Energy…[I]n 1987, CERT (Council of Energy Resource Tribes) received $2.5 million from federal nuclear waste contracts – more than half the organization’s total income. In 1992, CERT received $1.2 million in federal grants for nuclear waste programs – 80% of the group’s federal grants.

#### Impact is genocide by nuclear colonialism

Endres, Associate Professor in Communication @ Utah, 2009 [Danielle, “The Rhetoric of Nuclear Colonialism: Rhetorical Exclusion of American Indian Arguments in the Yucca Mountain Nuclear Waste Siting Decision,” Communication and Critical/Cultural Studies, Vol. 6, No. 1, March 2009, p. 41]

Before attending to the rhetorical nature of nuclear colonialism, it is important to¶ emphasize the scope and material effects of nuclear technologies on indigenous¶ peoples and their lands. This is a history of systematic exploitation and indigenous¶ resistance, spanning from the 1940s to present. As the Indigenous Environmental¶ Network writes,¶ “the nuclear industry has waged an undeclared war against our Indigenous peoples¶ and Pacific Islanders that has poisoned our communities worldwide. For more than¶ 50 years, the legacy of the nuclear chain, from exploration to the dumping of¶ radioactive waste has been proven, through documentation, to be genocide and¶ ethnocide and a deadly enemy of Indigenous peoples. . . . United States federal law¶ and nuclear policy has not protected Indigenous peoples, and in fact has been¶ created to allow the nuclear industry to continue operations at the expense of our¶ land, territory, health and traditional ways of life. . . . This disproportionate toxic¶ burden\*called environmental racism\*has culminated in the current attempts to¶ dump much of the nation’s nuclear waste in the homelands of the Indigenous¶ peoples of the Great Basin region of the United States.4”¶ From an indigenous perspective, the material consequences of nuclear colonialism¶ have affected the vitality of indigenous peoples. This can be seen clearly in both¶ uranium mining and nuclear testing. ¶¶ Uranium mining is inextricably linked with indigenous peoples. According to¶ LaDuke, ‘‘some 70 percent of the world’s uranium originates from Native¶ Communities.’’5 Within the US, approximately 66 percent of the known uranium¶ deposits are on reservation land, as much as 80 percent are on treaty-guaranteed land,¶ and up to 90 percent of uranium mining and milling occurs on or adjacent to¶ American Indian land.6 To support the federal government’s desire for nuclear¶ weapons and power production, the Bureau of Indians Affairs (BIA) has worked in¶ collusion with the Atomic Energy Commission and corporations such as Kerr-McGee¶ and United Nuclear to negotiate leases with Navajo, Lakota and other nations for¶ uranium mining and milling on their land between the 1950s to the present.7 BIA-negotiated¶ leases are supported by the complex body of Indian Law, which I will¶ demonstrate enables federal intrusion into American Indian lands and governmental¶ affairs. These leases are heavily tilted in favor of the corporations so that American¶ Indian nations received only about 3.4 percent of the market value of the uranium¶ and low paid jobs.8 Uranium mining has also resulted in severe health and¶ environmental legacies for affected American Indian people and their lands. From¶ uranium mining on Navajo land, there have been at least 450 reported cancer deaths¶ among Navajo mining employees.9 Even now, the legacy of over 1000 abandoned¶ mines and uranium tailing piles is radioactive dust that continues to put people living¶ near tailing piles at a high risk for lung cancer.10

#### The collective refusal to acknowledge the genocide of native community is tantamount to serial genocide. Neglecting their cultural diversity leads us on a path to extinction.

Friedberg, PhD Candidate, Germanic Studies, University of Illinois, 2k

(Lilian, “Dare to Compare,” *American Indian Quarterly*; Summer, Vol. 24 Issue 3, p. 353)

Attempts on the part of American Indians to transcend chronic, intergenerational maladies introduced by the settler population (for example, in the highly contested Casino industry, in the ongoing battles over tribal sovereignty, and so on) are challenged tooth and nail by the U.S. government and its "ordinary" people. Flexibility in transcending these conditions has been greatly curtailed by federal policies that have "legally" supplanted our traditional forms of governance, outlawed our languages and spirituality, manipulated our numbers and identity, usurped our cultural integrity, viciously repressed the leaders of our efforts to regain self-determination, and systematically miseducated the bulk of our youth to believe that this is, if not just, at least inevitable."[55] Today's state of affairs in America, both with regard to public memory and national identity, represents a flawless mirror image of the situation in Germany vis-hvis Jews and other non-Aryan victims of the Nazi regime.[56] Collective indifference to these conditions on the part of both white and black America is a poor reflection on the nation's character. This collective refusal to acknowledge the genocide further exacerbates the aftermath in Native communities and hinders the recovery process. This, too, sets the American situation apart from the German-Jewish situation: Holocaust denial is seen by most of the world as an affront to the victims of the Nazi regime. In America, the situation is the reverse: victims seeking recovery are seen as assaulting American ideals. But what is at stake today, at the dawn of a new millennium, is not the culture, tradition, and survival of one population on one continent on either side of the Atlantic. What is at stake is the very future of the human species. LaDuke, in her most recent work, contextualizes the issues from a contemporary perspective: Our experience of survival and resistance is shared with many others. But it is not only about Native people. ... In the final analysis, the survival of Native America is fundamentally about the collective survival of all human beings. The question of who gets to determine the destiny of the land, and of the people who live on it--those with the money or those who pray on the land--is a question that is alive throughout society.[57] "There is," as LaDuke reminds us, "a direct relationship between the loss of cultural diversity and the loss of biodiversity. Wherever Indigenous peoples still remain, there is also a corresponding enclave of biodiversity."[58] But, she continues, The last 150 years have seen a great holocaust. There have been more species lost in the past 150 years than since the Ice Age. (During the same time, Indigenous peoples have been disappearing from the face of the earth. Over 2,000 nations of Indigenous peoples have gone extinct in the western hemisphere and one nation disappears from the Amazon rainforest every year.)[59] It is not about "us" as indigenous peoples--it is about "us" as a human species. We are all related. At issue is no longer the "Jewish question" or the "Indian problem." We must speak today in terms of the "human problem." And it is this "problem" for which not a "final," but a sustainable, viable solution must be found--because it is no longer a matter of "serial genocide," it has become one of collective suicide. As Terrence Des Pres put it, in The Survivor: "At the heart of our problems is that nihilism which was all along the destiny of Western culture: a nihilism either unacknowledged even as the bombs fell or else, as with Hitler or Stalin, demonically proclaimed as the new salvation."

#### Overall, these extensions of genocidal carnage against native people are the root cause of violence and war

Paul Street, author, March 11, 2004.

[“Those Who Deny the Crimes of the Past Reflections on American Racist Atrocity Denial, 1776-2004,”

http://thereitis.org/displayarticle242.html]

It is especially important to appreciate the significance of the vicious, often explicitly genocidal "homeland" assaults on native-Americans, which set foundational racist and national-narcissist patterns for subsequent U.S. global butchery, disproportionately directed at non-European people of color. The deletion of the real story of the so-called "battle of Washita" from the official Seventh Cavalry history given to the perpetrators of the No Gun Ri massacre is revealing. Denial about Washita and Sand Creek (and so on) encouraged US savagery at Wounded Knee, the denial of which encouraged US savagery in the Philippines, the denial of which encouraged US savagery in Korea, the denial of which encouraged US savagery in Vietnam, the denial of which (and all before) has recently encouraged US savagery in Afghanistan and Iraq. It's a vicious circle of recurrent violence, well known to mental health practitioners who deal with countless victims of domestic violence living in the dark shadows of the imperial homeland's crippling, stunted, and indeed itself occupied social and political order. Power-mad US forces deploying the latest genocidal war tools, some suggestively named after native tribes that white North American "pioneers" tried to wipe off the face of the earth (ie, "Apache," "Blackhawk," and "Comanche" helicopters) are walking in bloody footsteps that trace back across centuries, oceans, forests and plains to the leveled villages, shattered corpses, and stolen resources of those who Roosevelt acknowledged as America's "original inhabitants." Racist imperial carnage and its denial, like charity, begin at home. Those who deny the crimes of the past are likely to repeat their offenses in the future as long as they retain the means and motive to do so.

#### This genocidal mentality against Natives is a priori because it is ontological

Wilderson 2010 [FB, Red, White, & Black]

Again, if Accumulation and Fungibility are the modalities through which embodied Blackness is positioned as incapacity, then Genocide is that modality through which embodied Redness is positioned as incapacity. Ontological incapacity, I have inferred and here state forthright, is the constituent element of ethics. Put another way, one cannot embody capacity and be, simultaneously, ethical. Where there are Slaves it is unethical to be free. The Settler/Master’s capacity, I have argued, is a function of exploitation and alienation; and the Slave’s incapacity is elaborated by accumulation and fungibility. But the “Savage” is positioned, structurally, by subjective capacity and objective incapacity, by sovereignty and genocide, respectively. It is the Indian’s liminal status in political economy, the manner in which her/his positionality shuttles between the incapacity of a genocided object and the capacity of a sovereign subject, coupled with the fact that Redness does not overdetermine the “thanatology” (Judy 89, 94) of libidinal economy—this liminal capacity within political economy and complete freedom from incapacity within libidinal economy—which raises serious doubts about the status of “Savage” ethicality vis-à-vis the triangulated structure (Red, White, and Black) of antagonisms. Clearly, the coherence of Whiteness as a structural position in modernity depends on the capacity to be free from genocide, not, perhaps, as an historical experience, but at least as a positioning modality. This embodied capacity (genocidal immunity) of Whiteness jettisons the White/Red relation from that of a conflict and marks it as an antagonism: it stains it with irreconcilability. Here, the Indian comes into being, and is positioned, by an a priori violence of genocide. Whiteness can also experience this kind of violence but only a fortiori: genocide may be one of a thousand contingent experiences of Whiteness but it is not a constituent element, it does not make Whites White (or Humans Human). Whiteness can grasp its own capacity, be present to itself, coherent, by its unavailability to the a priori violence of Red genocide, as well as by its unavailability to the a priori violence of Black accumulation and fungibility. If it experiences accumulation and fungibility, or genocide, those experiences must be named, qualified, i.e. “White slavery,” or the Armenian massacre, the Jewish Holocaust, Bosnian interment, so that such contingent experience is not confused with ontological necessity. In such a position one can always say, “I’m not a ‘Savage’” or “I’m being treated like a nigger.” One can reassert one’s Humanity by refusing the ruse of analogy. Regardless of Whites’ historical, and brief, encounters with the modalities of the “Savage” and of the Slave, these modalities do not break in on the position of Whiteness with such a force as to replace exploitation and alienation as the Settler/Master’s constituent elements. We might think of exploitation and alienation as modalities of suffering which inoculate Whiteness from death. If this is indeed the case, then perhaps Whiteness has no constituent elements other than the immanent status of immunity. Still, this immunity is no small matter, for it is the sin qua non of Human capacity.

#### Thus the plan: The United States Federal Government should provide a twenty-percent investment tax credit for the deployment of domestic nuclear fuel recycling.

#### Reprocessing would remove the entire waste problem – all of the waste we currently store can be reused.

Bastin 8 (Clinton, Former Chemical Engineer at the Atomic Energy Commission, 21st Century Science and Technology, “We Need to Reprocess Spent Nuclear Fuel, And Can Do It Safely, At Reasonable Cost”, 2008, [http://www.21stcenturysciencetech.com/Articles%202008/ Summer\_2008/Reprocessing.pdf](http://www.21stcenturysciencetech.com/Articles%202008/Summer_2008/Reprocessing.pdf), RSR)

The concept of used nuclear fuel as “nuclear waste” is a fiction created by the opponents of nuclear energy. Used nuclear fuel isn’t waste at all, but a renewable resource that can be reprocessed into new nuclear fuel and valuable isotopes. When we entered the nuclear age, the great promise of nuclear energy wasitsrenewability, making it an inexpensive and efficient way to produce electricity. It was assumed that the nations making use of nuclear energy would reprocess their spent fuel, completing the nuclear fuel cycle by recycling the nuclear fuel after it was burned in a reactor, to extract the 95 to 99 percent of unused uranium in it that can be turned into new fuel. This means that if the United States buries its 70,000 metric tons of spent nuclear fuel, we would be wasting 66,000 metric tons of uranium-28, which could be used to make new fuel. In addition, we would be wasting about 1,200 metric tons of fissile uranium-25 and plutonium-29, which can also be burned as fuel. Because of the high energy density in the nucleus, this relatively small amount of U.S. spent fuel (it would fit in one small house) is equivalent in energy to about 20 percent of the U.S. oil reserves. About 96 percent of the spent fuel the United States is now storing can be turned into new fuel. The 4 percent of the socalled waste that remains—2,500 metric tons—consists of highly radioactive materials, but these are also usable. There are about 80 tons each of cesium-17 and strontium-90 that could be separated out for use in medical applications, such as sterilization of medical supplies. Using isotope separation techniques, and fast-neutron bombardment for transmutation (technologies that the United States pioneered but now refuses to develop), we could separate out all sorts of isotopes, like americium, which is used in smoke detectors, or isotopes used in medical testing and treatment. Right now, the United Statesmust import 90 percent of its medical isotopes, used in 40,000 medical procedures daily. The diagram shows a closed nuclear fuel cycle. At present, the United States has no reprocessing, and stores spent fuel in pools or dry storage at nuclear plants. Existing nuclear reactors use only about 1 percent of the total energy value in uranium resources; fast reactors with fuel recycle would use essentially 100 percent, burning up all of the uranium and actinides, the long-lived fission products. In a properly managed and safeguarded system, the plutonium produced in fast reactors would remain in its spent fuel until needed for recycle.Thus, there need be no excess buildup of accessible plutonium. The plutonium could also be fabricated directly into new reactor fuel assemblies to be burned in nuclear plants.

#### This would obviate the need for uranium mining – we can power all nuclear power on recycled waste

World Nuclear Association 12 (Processing of Used Nuclear Fuel, World Nuclear Association, May 2012, http://www.world-nuclear.org/info/inf69.html, da 8-30-12)

Reprocessing used fuel to recover uranium (as reprocessed uranium, or RepU) and plutonium (Pu) avoids the wastage of a valuable resource. Most of it – about 96% – is uranium, of which less than 1% is the fissile U-235 (often 0.4-0.8%); and up to 1% is plutonium. Both can be recycled as fresh fuel, saving up to 30% of the natural uranium otherwise required. The materials potentially available for recycling (but locked up in stored used fuel) could conceivably run the US reactor fleet of about 100 GWe for almost 30 years with no new uranium input.¶ So far, almost 90,000 tonnes (of 290,000 t discharged) of used fuel from commercial power reactors has been reprocessed. Annual reprocessing capacity is now some 4000 tonnes per year for normal oxide fuels, but not all of it is operational.¶ Between now and 2030 some 400,000 tonnes of used fuel is expected to be generated worldwide, including 60,000 t in North America and 69,000 t in Europe.

#### Reprocessing permanently ends the Yucca mountain debate by eliminating storage

Waters, Editor, ‘9

[Henry, “Yucca Mountain: Obama’s Move Makes Sense”, The Columbia Daily Tribune, 3-9-2009,

<http://www.columbiatribune.com/news/2009/mar/09/yucca-mountain/>, RSR]

A better alternative is to reprocess nuclear fuel, leaving only some 10 percent of the toxic product as waste and reducing storage challenges to manageable on-site proportions. Other countries with nuclear plants have allowed reprocessing all along, eliminating politically charged arguments over large-scale waste storage and enabling more efficient operations. But during the Carter administration our government outlawed reprocessing for fear the concentrated residue, which can be used to make nuclear weapons, would fall into the hands of enemies. Nuclear waste has been stored on-site at power-generating plants while we argue how to do large-scale storage. Yucca had become the most logical site, but substantial opposition remained. Now, though Obama is not saying so, adopting a policy allowing fuel reprocessing would eliminate the storage problem. Nuclear plants could reprocess the stored fuel they have on hand, eliminating the need for off-site storage capacity indefinitely. Though I don’t know the technology well enough to promise, I think reprocessing existing stored fuel waste will eliminate the need for additional new fuel, also indefinitely. As we have become more familiar with nuclear power generation, we have learned to relax over its safety and dependability. Now we are learning to accept the idea of fuel reprocessing. Experts agree the threat of concentrated fuel residue from reprocessing falling into enemy hands is nil. For an enemy wanting to develop nuclear weaponry, the option of stealing reprocessed nuclear fuel residue is a poor one. These dregs would be spread around the country in small, easy-to-secure amounts. We should reprocess, eliminating the need for Yucca or any other centralized storage site. I reckon Obama & Co. have this in mind and are choosing to fully unveil their ideas about the future of nuclear fuel waste storage over time. The initial announcement said storage would remain on-site while next steps are determined. Fits right in.

#### Our criticism of the waste siting process is key to resist nuclear colonialism.

Endres, Associate Professor in Communication @ Utah, 2009 [Danielle, “The Rhetoric of Nuclear Colonialism: Rhetorical Exclusion of American Indian Arguments in the Yucca Mountain Nuclear Waste Siting Decision,” Communication and Critical/Cultural Studies, Vol. 6, No. 1, March 2009, p. 44-46]

Indigenous resistance over the years has created cracks in the system of resource¶ colonialism, resulting in more control over resources and more lucrative leases for¶ many American Indian nations.34 Recognizing the limitations of political sovereignty¶ as defined by US colonialist laws, Coffey and Tsosie and John Borrows have called for¶ indigenous people to reject political sovereignty and to assert and live by their¶ inherent sovereignty.35 Borrows calls for ‘‘an inherent, unextinguished, and continu-¶ ing exercise of self-government’’ that challenges the imposition of political¶ sovereignty upon American Indian nations by the federal government.36 The concept¶ of ‘‘inherent sovereignty’’ exemplifies the potential for resistance to colonization¶ through a constitutive redefinition of sovereignty that supersedes the political¶ definition.

Resistance to nuclearism comes in many forms, one of which is the body of scholarship called nuclear communication criticism. Within this corpus, Bryan Taylor¶ and William Kinsella advocate the study of ‘‘nuclear legacies’’ of the nuclear¶ production process.39 The material legacies of the nuclear production process include¶ the deaths of Navajo uranium miners, the left-over uranium tailings on Navajo land,¶ and Western Shoshone downwinders. However, nuclear waste is in need of more¶ examination; as Taylor writes, ‘‘nuclear waste represents one of the most complex and¶ highly charged controversies created by the postwar society. Perhaps daunted by its¶ technical, legal and political complexities, communication scholars have not widely¶ engaged this topic.’’40 One of the reasons that nuclear waste is such a complex¶ controversy is its connection with nuclear colonialism.¶ ¶ Nuclear communication criticism has focused on examination of the ‘‘practices¶ and processes of communication’’ related to the nuclear production process and the¶ legacies of this process.41 At least two themes in nuclear discourse are relevant to¶ nuclear colonialism: 1) invocation of national interest; and 2) constraints to public¶ debate. First, nuclear discourse is married to the professed national interest, calling¶ for the sacrifices among the communities affected by the legacies of the nuclear¶ production process.42 According to Kuletz, the American West has been constructed¶ as a ‘‘national sacrifice zone’’ because of its connection to the nuclear production¶ process.43 Nuclearism is tautological in its basic assumption that nuclear production¶ serves the national interest and national security and its use of national security and¶ national interest to justify nuclearism. The federal government justifies nuclear¶ production, which disproportionately takes place on American Indian land, as¶ serving the national security. This justification works with the strategy of colonialism¶ that defines American Indian people as part of the nation and not as separate,¶ inherently sovereign entities whose national interest may not include storing nuclear¶ waste on their land.

#### Resistance to waste storage in Yucca Mountain is specifically crucial to challenge nuclear colonialism

Endres, Associate Professor in Communication @ Utah, 2009 [Danielle, “The Rhetoric of Nuclear Colonialism: Rhetorical Exclusion of American Indian Arguments in the Yucca Mountain Nuclear Waste Siting Decision,” Communication and Critical/Cultural Studies, Vol. 6, No. 1, March 2009, p.

Now, with over 60 years of uranium mining, nuclear weapons production and¶ nuclear power, we face a high-level nuclear waste crisis. Once again, power brokers¶ have looked to exploit American Indian lands, resources and peoples. In the twenty-year¶ process of researching and authorizing a federal high-level nuclear waste¶ repository site, only sites on American Indian land were seriously considered. In¶ addition to the Yucca Mountain site, American Indian nations were also targeted for¶ temporary waste storage through the now-defunct Monitored Retrievable Storage¶ (MRS) program.17 And recently, a proposal by Private Fuel Storage (PFS) and the¶ Skull Valley Goshutes to temporarily store nuclear waste at Skull Valley Goshute¶ reservation was defeated by Skull Valley activists working with the State of Utah¶ against the Skull Valley government and PFS.18 The struggle over the Yucca Mountain¶ nuclear waste site is, as Kuletz pointed out, a continuation of struggles against nuclear¶ colonialism: ‘‘Indian protests over the use of Yucca Mountain as a high-level nuclear-waste¶ dump cannot be seen as an anomaly. Rather, they are a part of a persistent¶ pattern of resistance to military occupation and nuclear activity.’’19 Although we do¶ not yet know the health and environmental effects of permanent nuclear waste¶ storage, nuclear colonialism is not just about health and environmental devastation.¶ It also intersects with sovereignty, nuclearism and colonialism, to which I now turn.

#### Challenging nuclear colonialism is crucial to ending exploitation of Natives

Endres, Associate Professor in Communication @ Utah, 2009 [Danielle, “The Rhetoric of Nuclear Colonialism: Rhetorical Exclusion of American Indian Arguments in the Yucca Mountain Nuclear Waste Siting Decision,” Communication and Critical/Cultural Studies, Vol. 6, No. 1, March 2009, p. 43-44]

The present form of colonialism in the US is what Al Gedicks has called resource¶ colonialism, whereby ‘‘native peoples are under assault on every continent because¶ their lands contain a wide variety of valuable resources needed for industrial¶ development.’’24 As described by Marjene Ambler, the US government works in¶ collusion with large national and multinational corporations to facilitate leases and¶ access to indigenous resources that benefit the government and corporations to the¶ detriment of indigenous communities.25 Resource colonialism depends on ignoring¶ the land ownership rights of the colonized. As such, it also relies on the country’s¶ legal and political system to limit the rights of the colonized, specifically drawing on¶ both the domestic dependent relationship and the trust relationship that holds¶ American Indian lands and monies in ‘‘trust’’ through the Bureau of Indian Affairs.26¶ As American Indian Studies scholar Sharon O’Brien states, ‘‘today’s ‘Indian wars’ are¶ being fought in corporate boardrooms and law offices as tribes endeavor to protect¶ and control their remaining resources.’’27 Resource colonialism is a reality for many¶ tribes in the US, especially those with oil, gas, coal and uranium reserves. In the¶ American West, the Western Shoshone, Navajo, Southern Ute, Paiute and Laguna¶ nations possess a wealth of natural resources including uranium ore and vast desert¶ ‘‘wastelands’’ for nuclear waste storage. Historian Gabrielle Hecht noted that ‘‘the¶ history of uranium mining . . . shows that colonial practices and structures were¶ appropriated\*not overthrown\*by the nuclear age, and proved central to its¶ technopolitical success.’’28 Nuclear colonialism is a tale of resource colonialism.

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#### The case outweighs discursive erasure of the Native Americans in the status quo via waste colonialism and the siting of Yucca Mountain is nuclear genocide at the hands of the state. The refusal to acknowledge this serial violence is the root cause of war and commits apriori ontological violence.

#### The first priority should be to restore Native American land rights – it’s the first thing we should weigh in this debate.

Ward Churchill 1996 (Professor of Ethnic Studies at University of Colorado, Boulder, BA and MA in Communications from Sangamon State, *From A Native Son* pgs 85-90)

Hence even progressives who are most eloquently inclined to condemn US imperialism abroad and/or the functions of racism and sexism at home tend to deliver a blank stare or profess open “disinterest” when indigenous land rights are mentioned. Instead of attempting to come to grips with this most fundamental of all issues the more sophisticated among them seek to divert discussions into “higher priority” or “more important” topics like “issues of class and gender equality” in which “justice” becomes synonymous with a redistribution of power and loot deriving from the occupation of Native North America even while occupation continues. Sometimes, Indians are even slated to receive “their fair share” in the division of spoils accruing from expropriation of their resources. Always, such things are couched in terms of some “greater good” than decolonizing the .6 percent of the U.S. population which is indigenous. Some Marxist and environmentalist groups have taken the argument so far as to deny that Indians possess any rights distinguishable from those of their conquerors. AIM leader Russell Means snapped the picture into sharp focus when he observed n 1987 that: so-called progressives in the United States claiming that Indians are obligated to give up their rights because a much larger group of non-Indians “need” their resources is exactly the same as Ronald Reagan and Elliot Abrams asserting that the rights of 250 million North Americans outweigh the rights of a couple million Nicaraguans (continues). Leaving aside the pronounced and pervasive hypocrisy permeating these positions, which add up to a phenomenon elsewhere described as “settler state colonialism,” the fact is that the specter driving even most radical non-Indians into lockstep with the federal government on questions of native land rights is largely illusory. The alternative reality posed by native liberation struggles is actually much different: While government propagandists are wont to trumpet—as they did during the Maine and Black Hills land disputes of the 1970s—that an Indian win would mean individual non-Indian property owners losing everything, the native position has always been the exact opposite. Overwhelmingly, the lands sought for actual recovery have been governmentally and corporately held. Eviction of small land owners has been pursued only in instances where they have banded together—as they have during certain of the Iroquois claims cases—to prevent Indians from recovering any land at all, and to otherwise deny native rights. Official sources contend this is inconsistent with the fact that all non-Indian title to any portion of North America could be called into question. Once “the dike is breached,” they argue, it’s just a matter of time before “everybody has to start swimming back to Europe, or Africa or wherever.” Although there is considerable technical accuracy to admissions that all non-Indian title to North America is illegitimate, Indians have by and large indicated they would be content to honor the cession agreements entered into by their ancestors, even though the United States has long since defaulted. This would leave somewhere close to two-thirds of the continental United States in non-Indian hands, with the real rather than pretended consent of native people. The remaining one-third, the areas delineated in Map II to which the United States never acquired title at all would be recovered by its rightful owners. The government holds that even at that there is no longer sufficient land available for unceded lands, or their equivalent, to be returned. In fact, the government itself still directly controls more than one-third of the total U.S. land area, about 770 million acres. Each of the states also “owns” large tracts, totaling about 78 million acres. It is thus quite possible—and always has been—for all native claims to be met in full without the loss to non-Indians of a single acre of privately held land. When it is considered that 250 million-odd acres of the “privately” held total are now in the hands of major corporate entities, the real dimension of the “threat” to small land holders (or more accurately, lack of it) stands revealed. Government spokespersons have pointed out that the disposition of public lands does not always conform to treaty areas. While this is true, it in no way precludes some process of negotiated land exchange wherein the boundaries of indigenous nations are redrawn by mutual consent to an exact, or at least a much closer conformity. All that is needed is an honest, open, and binding forum—such as a new bilateral treaty process—with which to proceed. In fact, numerous native peoples have, for a long time, repeatedly and in a variety of ways, expressed a desire to participate in just such a process. Nonetheless, it is argued, there will still be at least some non-Indians “trapped” within such restored areas. Actually, they would not be trapped at all. The federally imposed genetic criteria of “Indian –ness” discussed elsewhere in this book notwithstanding, indigenous nations have the same rights as any other to define citizenry by allegiance (naturalization) rather than by race. Non-Indians could apply for citizenship, or for some form of landed alien status which would allow them to retain their property until they die. In the event they could not reconcile themselves to living under any jurisdiction other than that of the United States, they would obviously have the right to leace, and they should have the right to compensation from their own government (which got them into the mess in the first place). Finally, and one suspects this is the real crux of things from the government/corporate perspective, any such restoration of land and attendant sovereign prerogatives to native nations would result in a truly massive loss of “domestic” resources to the United States, thereby impairing the country’s economic and military capacities (see “Radioactive Colonialism” essay for details). For everyone who queued up to wave flags and tie on yellow ribbons during the United States’ recent imperial adventure in the Persian Gulf, this prospect may induce a certain psychic trauma. But, for progressives at least, it should be precisely the point. When you think about these issues in this way, the great mass of non-Indians in North America really have much to gain and almost nothing to lose, from the success of native people in struggles to reclaim the land which is rightfully ours. The tangible diminishment of US material power which is integral to our victories in this sphere stands to pave the way for realization of most other agendas from anti-imperialism to environmentalism, from African American liberation to feminism, from gay rights to the ending of class privilege – pursued by progressive on this continent. Conversely, succeeding with any or even all of these other agendas would still represent an inherently oppressive situation in their realization is contingent upon an ongoing occupation of Native North America without the consent of Indian people. Any North American revolution which failed to free indigenous territory from non-Indian domination would be simply a continuation of colonialism in another form. Regardless of the angle from which you view the matter, the liberation of Native North America, liberation of the land first and foremost, is the key to fundamental and positive social changes of many other sorts. One thing they say, leads to another. The question has always been, of course, which “thing” is to the first in the sequence. A preliminary formulation for those serious about achieving radical change in the United States might be “First Priority to First Americans” Put another way this would mean, “US out of Indian Country.” Inevitably, the logic leads to what we’ve all been so desperately seeking: The United States – at least what we’ve come to know it – out of North America altogether. From there it can be permanently banished from the planet. In its stead, surely we can join hands to create something new and infinitely better. That’s our vision of “impossible realism.” Isn’t it time we all worked on attaining it?

#### Native American rights are a prerequisite to confronting imperialism, racism, colonialism and genocide.

Churchill, Professor of Ethnic Studies at University of Colorado, ‘96

[Ward, From a Native Son, pg. 30-31, RSR]

The sort of alliance at issue no longer represents, as it did in the past, an exercise in altruism for non-Indians. Anti-imperialism, opposition to racism, colonialism, and genocide, while worthy enough to stances in and of themselves, are no longer the fundamental issues at hand. Ultimately, the same system of predatory goals and values which has so busily and mercilessly consumed the people of the land these past five centuries has increasingly set about consuming the land itself. Not only indigenous peoples, but also the land to which they are irrevocably linked, is now dying. When the land itself dies, it is a certainty that no humans can survive the struggle which confronts us- *all* of us- is thus a struggle to save our collective habitat, to mai ntain it as a “survivable” environment, not only for ourselves, but also for the generations to come. Self-evidently, this cannot be approached either from the posture of the predator or from any other position which allows the predator to continue with business as usual. At long last, we have arrived at the point where there is a tangible, even overriding, confluence of interests between natives and non-natives.

The crux of the matter rests, not merely in resistance to the predatory nature of the present Eurocentric status quo, but in conceiving viable sociocultural alternatives. Here, the bodies of indigenous knowledge evidenced in the context of Native North America at the point of the European invasion--large-scale societies which had perfected ways of organizing themselves into psychologically fulfilling wholes, experiencing very high standards of material life, and still maintaining environmental harmony- shine like a beacon in the night. The information required to recreate this reality is still in place in many indigenous cultures. The liberation of significant sectors of Native America stands to allow this knowledge to once again be actualized kin the “real world,” not to recreate indigenous societies as they once were, but to recreate themselves as they can be in the future. Therein lies the model-the laboratory, if you will-from which a genuinely liberatory and sustainable alternative can be cast for all humanity. In a very real sense, then, the fate of Native North America signifies the fate of the planet. It follows that it is incumbent upon every conscious human- red, white, black, brown, or yellow, old or young, male or female- to do whatever is within their power to ensure that the next half-millennium heralds an antithesis to the last.

#### This is a net benefit to the permutation - native decolonization spills over – paving the way to broader gains.

Churchill, Professor of Ethnic Studies at University of Colorado, ‘96

[Ward, From a Native Son, pg. 84-89, RSR]

The question which inevitably arises with regard to indigenous land claims, especially in the United States, is whether they are “realistic.” The answer, of course is, “No, they aren’t.” Further, no form of decolonization has ever been realistic when viewed within the construct of a colonialist paradigm. It wasn’t realistic at the time to expect George Washington’s rag-tag militia to defeat the British military during the American Revolution. Just ask the British. It wasn’t realistic, as the French could tell you, that the Vietnamese should be able to defeat U.S.-backed France in 1954, or that the Algerians would shortly be able to follow in their footsteps. Surely, it wasn’t reasonable to predict that Fidel Castro’s pitiful handful of guerillas would overcome Batista’s regime in Cuba, another U.S. client, after only a few years in the mountains. And the Sandinistas, to be sure, had no prayer of attaining victory over Somoza 20 years later. Henry Kissinger, among others, knew that for a fact. The point is that in each case, in order to begin their struggles at all, anti-colonial fighters around the world have had to abandon orthodox realism in favor of what they knew to be right. To paraphrase Bendit, they accepted as their agenda, a redefinition of reality in terms deemed quite impossible within the conventional wisdom of their oppressors. And in each case, they succeeded in their immediate quest for liberation. The fact that all but one (Cuba) of the examples used subsequently turned out to hold colonizing pretensions of its own does not alter the truth of this—or alter the appropriateness of their efforts to decolonize themselves—in the least. It simply means that decolonization has yet to run its course, that much remains to be done. The battles waged by native nations in North America to free themselves, and the lands upon which they depend for ongoing existence as discernible peoples, from the grip of U.S. (and Canadian) internal colonialism are plainly part of this process of liberation. Given that their very survival depends upon their perseverance in the face of all apparent odds, American Indians have no real alternative but to carry on. They must struggle, and where there is struggle there is always hope. Moreover, the unrealistic or “romantic” dimensions of our aspiration to quite literally dismantle the territorial corpus of the U.S. state begin to erode when one considers that federal domination of Native North America is utterly contingent upon maintenance of a perceived confluence of interests between prevailing governmental/corporate elites and common non-Indian citizens. Herein lies the prospect of long-term success. It is entirely possibly that the consensus of opinion concerning non-Indian “rights” to exploit the land and resources of indigenous nations can be eroded, and that large numbers of non-Indians will join in the struggle to decolonize Native North America. When you think about these issues in this way, the great mass of non-Indians in North America really have much to gain and almost nothing to lose, from the success of native people in struggles to reclaim the land which is rightfully ours. The tangible diminishment of US material power which is integral to our victories in this sphere stands to pave the way for realization of most other agendas from anti-imperialism to environmentalism, from African American liberation to feminism, from gay rights to the ending of class privilege – pursued by progressive on this continent. Conversely, succeeding with any or even all of these other agendas would still represent an inherently oppressive situation in their realization is contingent upon an ongoing occupation of Native North America without the consent of Indian people. Any North American revolution which failed to free indigenous territory from non-Indian domination would be simply a continuation of colonialism in another form. Regardless of the angle from which you view the matter, the liberation of Native North America, liberation of the land first and foremost, is the key to fundamental and positive social changes of many other sorts. One thing they say, leads to another. The question has always been, of course, which “thing” is to the first in the sequence. A preliminary formulation for those serious about achieving radical change in the United States might be “First Priority to First Americans” Put another way this would mean, “US out of Indian Country.” Inevitably, the logic leads to what we’ve all been so desperately seeking: The United States – at least what we’ve come to know it – out of North America altogether. From there it can be permanently banished from the planet. In its stead, surely we can join hands to create something new and infinitely better. That’s our vision of “impossible realism.” Isn’t it time we all worked on attaining it?

#### Wilderson is not a double turn. Wilderson advocates challenging the apriori genocide of Native Americans in the SQUO. Plan does that by challenging nuclear waste siting.

#### Permutation do both – Our discursive challenge of the systemic problems that plague Native Americans in the SQUO open up spaces to challenge the nuclear genocide that is plaguing their communities in the SQUO. We also link and parallel our struggle to those of the Apache, Skull Valley Goshute, and Fort Mcdermitt Paiute-Shoshone reservations **that challenge the structures of nuclear waste siting in the SQUO. We are engaged in the type of critique that their Polson evidence talks about. We advocate for group struggle and continued liberation to sruggle against white supremacy/**

#### They don’t do activism in this round – their activism is just as important as our discursive activism in this round.

#### Their alternative cannot solve the affirmative. 1AC Endres evidence states that challenging waste siting and the siting of Yucca Mountain is the only way to move away from the ethics that have promoted nuclear colonialism in the squo. Our communication criticism and role as communication scholars is uniquely important in the case of waste siting.

#### \*\*\*Analysis of our embededness in institution is key to check genocide.

Code 8 [Murray, “Life, Thought, and Morality: Or, Does Matter Really Matter?” in *Cosmos and History* 4.2]

To sum up the story so far, all the philosophers I have named point up the possibility that good sense ultimately depends on moral and/or ethical as well as rational instincts. I have further suggested that moral concerns ought to be distinguished from ethical concerns, where the former allude to what an individual may feel in respect to his/her own actions and thoughts. For a certain freedom must be inherent in every act of becoming, as Whitehead points out, if morality is not completely meaningless. In other words, the core meaning of morality seems best elucidated partly in terms of how the individual exercises its active powers in the ongoing business of making sense of the world; which is an activity that is never completely predetermined. But to take this thought any further, it is necessary to acquire a better understanding of a ‘moral self’. For the modern naturalist might at this point object that my story has now reached an impasse, with the most important question scarcely touched. Yet it is merely time to turn away from nature and look to culture for hints as to how to proceed. Not only is this always feasible in a nonmodern metaphysical imaginary, such as Whitehead’s wherein nature-culture is viewed as an indivisible polarity. One of the principal tropes in his imaginary is a vital society, which is a metaphor fully in keeping with the public-private contrast since a society can be viewed as the complement of an actual entity. So in so far as an actual entity can be modeled as a living, ensouled body (as I have argued elsewhere), and hence as a self with a personal identity, a vital society can also be conceived as an integral entity that is much more than a mere aggregation of essentially independent individuals who have banded together for purposes of convenience, safety, and so on. That is to say, in brief, a culture can be invested with a more or less healthy soul, and hence a more or less healthy morality. However, since the tricky question of the meaning of morality now looms large, perhaps the best way to go on is with the help of a historical study of those moral/ethical crises where the health of soul of the whole culture as well as that of the souls of its individual members souls have been most dramatically put into jeopardy. Such anyway is the ‘method’ that Hannah Arendt effectively promotes in her quest to understand the kind of evil that the Nazis entrenched in the supposedly ‘high’ culture of Germany in the 1930s. For the very nature of this form of totalitarianism, which successfully subordinated politics to a poisonous ethics, indicates that the vexed question ‘What is a moral self?’ needs to be approached from the private perspective; that is, from the point of view of an individual faced with serious moral/ethical dilemmas that cannot be resolved by appealing to communally (i.e. politically) established values, norms, rules for behaviour, formal laws, and so on. Or as Arendt sums up the matter: The criterion of right and wrong, the answer to the question, what ought I to do? depends in the last analysis neither on habit and customs, which I share with those around me, nor on a command of either divine or human origin, but on what I decide with regard to myself.[14] This claim implies that morality can be roughly distinguished from ethics in the manner I have sketched above, where a moral self alludes to a capacity for good ‘inward looking’ while an ethical self is more concerned with good ‘outward looking’. Hence Arendt’s response to the burning question of the would-be true naturalist in search of a true moralism (how might one conceive a truly moral Self?) seems highly pertinent to the quest for a Whiteheadian theory of morality. According to Arendt, in those situations that cry out in vain for some “ultimate standard’’ upon which to base a moral decision, the best one can do is look to oneself (RJ, 76). This answer owes much to Socrates, for Arendt generally endorses his maxim, that it is better to suffer wrong than to do wrong. She is moreover sympathetic to the view of Socrates that “men are not merely rational animals but thinking beings’’ (RJ, 72). The question is, then, whether the human animal with its manifestly unique capacity for thought has on that account a certain moral responsibility. The nature of this responsibility is, however, very hard to pin down, partly because thinking, while being a natural human activity, is far from being a highly valued activity; yet it seems one can no more stop thinking than one can stop breathing; that is, unless thinking is deliberately subverted, diverted, or blocked, either by internal or external means. Indeed, the best way to avoid thinking, according to Arendt, is to ensure that one is never alone with oneself, for when that happens one becomes a ‘two-in-one’ with a propensity to have discourse with oneself—as in trying to form an opinion, make up one’s mind, and so on. Strictly speaking, then, in this sketch of a moral self, one is not referring to an independent or isolated entity but rather to a potentially multiple self, since a ‘two-in-one’ self may spring into existence whenever an individual self disengages from whatever it happens to be doing and becomes free to dwell in other places and other times. In such moments of withdrawal from the day-to-day business of life—that is, when one ‘stops to think’ (as the common phrase suggestively has it)—the arrested self is most likely to reflect on past actions or thoughts as though they belonged to another (RJ, 162). This sort of self-examination presupposes, however, a will or desire to think, which includes remembering and/or anticipating. Hence inasmuch as Arendt is claiming that a moral self is one who is inclined under moments of stress to listen to an inner voice that says “I cannot do certain things because having done them I shall no longer be able to live with myself,’’ such a self must also be one capable of recognizing the ‘certain things’ that may give rise to future psychic pain. This requires a capacity to imagine those feelings that could make life unbearable at some future time “when I speak with myself about whatever happens to concern me.’’ One may therefore wonder whether the psychic pain the moral self wishes to avoid is evidence, perhaps the only evidence that it is possible to have, of a moral instinct which is the germ of a moral/ethical faculty.[15] Such a moral instinct must be exceedingly fragile, however, as is evident from the example of Adolf Eichmann. Arendt is especially struck by Eichmann’s apparent inability to feel anything at all even when reminded of his role in the monstrous crime of the ‘final solution’. This was not because he was a stupid, sadistic brute incapable of feeling anything. He was rather a fairly ordinary yet remarkably thoughtless functionary who was unable to proceed in his thinking beyond certain prescribed limits. That is, he was simply unable to imagine the actual plight of the victims of the killing machinery he so diligently helped to build. The irony is that his very diligence warrants crediting him with ethical standards since he was notably punctilious in observing the code of ethics of the state he so mindlessly served. No doubt the question of Eichmann’s conscience is an especially tricky one, as Arendt notes, for one cannot say that he entirely lacked a conscience. Observing that the idea of a conscience stems from what we now call consciousness, she perhaps more significantly indicates that Eichmann possessed a stunted, or severely truncated, consciousness. In other words, his example is important just because he illustrates well the value of the lesson that Socrates teaches. For the chief aim of Socrates, in Arendt’s view, was to teach people “how to think, how to talk to themselves.’’ Having no particular doctrine to impart, he was intent upon showing that those who fail to learn the art of interrogating themselves are seriously at risk of losing themselves. Eichmann not only bears this lesson out, he also reveals that he was far from being alone in learning a kind of thoughtlessness; for countless of his law-abiding fellow citizens appear to have been taught by just the kind of teacher that Socrates is warning us against. Arendt’s invention of the phrase ‘banality of evil’ is thus important just because it suggests that twentieth century European history illustrates what may be the most valuable Socratic lesson of them all—that the souls of entire collectivities can be induced to betray themselves through systems of education that render the souls of the majority of their members moribund. Addressing the puzzle of why Eichmann and thousands of his colleagues could so efficiently and coldly destroy the personalities of their victims, she notes that this was easy for them since they had already killed their own personalities, or souls. For the example of Eichmann also shows, by default as it were, that a would-be moral self would do well to reflect long and hard on the early Kant’s claim that the faculty of imagination is a “blind but indispensable function of the soul’’ without which there can be no experiencing at all—which is to say no serious thinking, among other things. If remembering is essential to good representing (and even if memory is only re-representing), to lose the vital power of imagination is arguably to lose not only oneself but also the whole world. For it is not incidental that Eichmann and his peers typically could not remember what they had or had not done; by allowing or conspiring in the suppression of the most vital function of their souls, they had rendered themselves into virtually dead souls capable of limitless evil.[16] In sum, then, Arendt’s chilling account of the ease with which a hitherto civilized culture can destroy its own soul indicates that a moral self must not only be infused with an instinctive desire to avoid doing anything that might later give rise to feelings of self-disgust or self-hatred. A truly moral self must also be infused with a desire to learn how to preserve and extend its most vital powers, not the least of which may be the faculty of imagination. The lesson of Eichmann is that if one fails to accept any responsibility for nurturing this indispensable function of the soul, one will be at risk of joining those apparently inexhaustible legions of half-dead but ethically upright souls who, like self-propagating clones of Eichmann, are even now hard at work bringing the world ever closer to an abyss.

#### Alternative cannot solve the K:

#### “Politics” is good in and of itself—we must recognize that politics in debate is necessary in order to ward off the totalitarian tendencies of instrumental politics and the paralytic tendencies of postmodern theory.

Togerson 99 [Douglass, *The Promise of Green* Politics, pp. 154-156]

One rationale for Arendt’s emphasis on the intrinsic value of politics is that this value has been so neglected by modernity that politics itself is threatened. Without a celebration of the intrinsic value of politics, neither functional nor constitutive political activity has any apparent rationale for continuing once its ends have been achieved. Functional politics might well be replaced by a technocratic management of advanced industrial society. A constitutive politics intent on social transformation might well be eclipsed by the coordinated direction of a cohesive social movement. In neither case would any need be left for what Arendt takes to be the essence of politics, there would be no need for debate. Green authoritarianism, following in the footsteps of Hobbes, has been all too ready to reduce politics to governance. Similarly, proponents of deep ecology, usually vague about politics, at least have been able to recognize totalitarian dangers in a position that disparages public opinion in favor of objective management? Any attempt to plot a comprehensive strategy for a cohesive green movement, moreover, ultimately has to adopt a no- nonsense posture while erecting clear standards by which to identify and excommunicate the enemy that is within. Green politics from its inception, however, has challenged the officialdom of advanced industrial society by invoking the cultural idiom of the carnivalesque. Although tempted by visions of tragic heroism, as we saw in chapter , green politics has also celebrated the irreverence of the comic, of a world turned upside down to crown the fool. In a context of political the ater, instrumentalism is often attenuated, at least momentarily displaced by a joy of performance. The comic dimension of political action can also be more than episodic. The image of the Lilliputians tying up the giant suggests well the strength and flexibility of a decentered constitutive politics. In a functional context, green politics offers its own technology of foolish ness in response to the dysfunctions of industrialism, even to the point of exceeding the comfortable limits of a so-called responsible foolishness. Highlighting the comic, these tendencies within green politics begin to suggest an intrinsic value to politics. To the extent that this value is recognized, politics is inimical to authoritarianism and offers a poison pill to the totalitarian propensities of an industrialized mass society. To value political action for its own sake, in other words, at least has the significant extrinsic value of defending against the antipolitical inclinations of modernity. But what is the intrinsic value of politics? Arendt would locate this value in the virtuosity of political action, particularly as displayed in debate. Although political debate surely has extrinsic value, this does not exhaust its value. Debate is a language game that, to be played well, cannot simply be instrumentalized for the services it can render but must also be played for its own sake. Any game pressed into the service of external goals tends to lose its playful quality; it ceases to be fun. It was in reflecting on the social movements of the 1960s that Arendt proclaimed the discovery that political action was fun. It was fun even though it sprang from moral purposes and even though political debate also enhanced the rationality of opinion formation. Arendt’s affirmation of the apparently frivolous value of fun sharply contrasts with her earlier celebration of glory, even of public happiness. The affirmation nonetheless suggests a particular promise of politics, a promise especially contained in the comic dimension of green politics.

#### \*\*\*We must engage the institutions of the status quo in order to *act* because action occurs in the medium of human plurality made meaningful by its historical embededness in institutions.

Arendt 1958 [Hannah, *The Human Condition*, pp. 182-185]

Action and speech go on between men, as they are directed toward them, and they retain their agent-revealing capacity even if their content is exclusively "objective," concerned with the matters of the world of things in which men move, which physically lies between them and out of which arise their specific, objective, worldly interests. These interests constitute, in the word's most literal significance, something which inter-est, which lies between people and therefore can relate and bind them together. Most action and speech is concerned with this in-between, which varies with each group of people, so that most words and deeds are about some worldly objective reality in addition to being a disclosure of the acting and speaking agent. Since this disclosure of the subject is an integral part of all, even the most "objective" intercourse, the physical, worldy in-between along with its inter- ests is overlaid and, as it were, overgrown with an altogether different in-between which consists of deeds and words and owes its origin exclusively to men's acting and speaking directly to one another. This second, subjective in-between is not tangible, since there are no tangible objects into which it could solidify; the process of acting and speaking can leave behind no such results and end products. But for all its intangibility, this in-between is no less real than the world of things we visibly have in common. We call this reality the "web" of human relationships, indicating by the metaphor its somewhat intangible quality. To be sure, this web is no less bound to the objective world of things than speech is to the existence of a living body, but the relationship is not like that of a facade or, in Marxian terminology, of an essentially superfluous superstructure affixed to the useful structure of the building itself. The basic error of all materialism in politics—and this materialism is not Marxian and not even modern in origin, but as old as our history of political theory8— is to overlook the inevitability with which men disclose themselves as subjects, as distinct and unique persons, even when they wholly concentrate upon reaching an altogether worldly, material object. To dispense with this disclosure, if indeed it could ever be done, would mean to transform men into something they are not; to deny, on the other hand, that this disclosure is real and has consequences of its own is simply unrealistic. The realm of human affairs, strictly speaking, consists of the web of human relationships which exists wherever men live together. The disclosure of the "who" through speech, and the setting of a new beginning through action, always fall into an already existing web where their immediate consequences can be felt. Together they start a new process which eventually emerges as the unique life story of the newcomer, affecting uniquely the life stories of all those with whom he comes into contact. It is because of this already existing web of human relationships, with its innumerable, conflicting wills and intentions, that action almost never achieves its purpose; but it is also because of this medium, in which action alone is real, that it "produces" stories with or without intention as naturally as fabrication produces tangible things. These stories may then be recorded in documents and monuments, they may be visible in use objects or art works, they may be told and retold and worked into all kinds of material. They themselves, in their living reality, are of an altogether different nature than these reifications. They tell us more about their subjects, the "hero" in the center of each story, than any product of human hands ever tells us about the master who produced it, and yet they are not products, properly speaking. Although everybody started his life by inserting himself into the human world through action and speech, nobody is the author or producer of his own life story. In other words, the stories, the results of action and speech, reveal an agent, but this agent is not an author or producer. Somebody began it and is its subject in the twofold sense of the word, namely, its actor and sufferer, but nobody is its author.

#### Decisionmaking: Linking the ballot to a *should* question in combination with USFG simulation teaches the skills to organize pragmatic consequences *and* philosophical values into a course of action

Hanghoj, Assistant Professor at the University of Aarhus in Denmark, ‘8

[Thorkild, Copenhagen, 2008, 4.2.1., “Play and imagination”

http://static.sdu.dk/mediafiles/Files/Information\_til/Studerende\_ved\_SDU/Din\_uddannelse/phd\_hum/afhandlinger/2009/ThorkilHanghoej.pdf]

 Joas’ re-interpretation of Dewey’s pragmatism as a “theory of situated creativity” raises a critique of humans as purely rational agents that navigate instrumentally through meansendsschemes (Joas, 1996: 133f). This critique is particularly important when trying to understand how games are enacted and validated within the realm of educational institutions that by definition are inscribed in the great modernistic narrative of “progress” where nation states, teachers and parents expect students to acquire specific skills and competencies (Popkewitz, 1998; cf. chapter 3). However, as Dewey argues, the actual doings of educational gaming cannot be reduced to rational means-ends schemes. Instead, the situated interaction between teachers, students, and learning resources are played out as contingent re-distributions of means, ends and ends in view, which often make classroom contexts seem “messy” from an outsider’s perspective (Barab & Squire, 2004). 4.2.3. Dramatic rehearsal The two preceding sections discussed how Dewey views play as an imaginative activity of educational value, and how his assumptions on creativity and playful actions represent a critique of rational means-end schemes. For now, I will turn to Dewey’s concept of dramatic rehearsal, which assumes that social actors deliberate by projecting and choosing between various scenarios for future action. Dewey uses the concept dramatic rehearsal several times in his work but presents the most extensive elaboration in Human Nature and Conduct: Deliberation is a dramatic rehearsal (in imagination) of various competing possible lines of action… [It] is an experiment in finding out what the various lines of possible action are really like (...) Thought runs ahead and foresees outcomes, and thereby avoids having to await the instruction of actual failure and disaster. An act overtly tried out is irrevocable, its consequences cannot be blotted out. An act tried out in imagination is not final or fatal. It is retrievable (Dewey, 1922: 132-3). This excerpt illustrates how Dewey views the process of decision making (deliberation) through the lens of an imaginative drama metaphor. Thus, decisions are made through the imaginative projection of outcomes, where the “possible competing lines of action” are resolved through a thought experiment. Moreover, Dewey’s compelling use of the drama metaphor also implies that decisions cannot be reduced to utilitarian, rational or mechanical exercises, but that they have emotional, creative and personal qualities as well. Interestingly, there are relatively few discussions within the vast research literature on Dewey of his concept of dramatic rehearsal. A notable exception is the phenomenologist Alfred Schütz, who praises Dewey’s concept as a “fortunate image” for understanding everyday rationality (Schütz, 1943: 140). Other attempts are primarily related to overall discussions on moral or ethical deliberation (Caspary, 1991, 2000, 2006; Fesmire, 1995, 2003; Rönssön, 2003; McVea, 2006). As Fesmire points out, dramatic rehearsal is intended to describe an important phase of deliberation that does not characterise the whole process of making moral decisions, which includes “duties and contractual obligations, short and long-term consequences, traits of character to be affected, and rights” (Fesmire, 2003: 70). Instead, dramatic rehearsal should be seen as the process of “crystallizing possibilities and transforming them into directive hypotheses” (Fesmire, 2003: 70). Thus, deliberation can in no way guarantee that the response of a “thought experiment” will be successful. But what it can do is make the process of choosing more intelligent than would be the case with “blind” trial-and-error (Biesta, 2006: 8). The notion of dramatic rehearsal provides a valuable perspective for understanding educational gaming as a simultaneously real and imagined inquiry into domain-specific scenarios. Dewey defines dramatic rehearsal as the capacity to stage and evaluate “acts”, which implies an “irrevocable” difference between acts that are “tried out in imagination” and acts that are “overtly tried out” with real-life consequences (Dewey, 1922: 132-3). This description shares obvious similarities with games as they require participants to inquire into and resolve scenario-specific problems (cf. chapter 2). On the other hand, there is also a striking difference between moral deliberation and educational game activities in terms of the actual consequences that follow particular actions. Thus, when it comes to educational games, acts are both imagined and tried out, but without all the real-life consequences of the practices, knowledge forms and outcomes that are being simulated in the game world. Simply put, there is a difference in realism between the dramatic rehearsals of everyday life and in games, which only “play at” or simulate the stakes and risks that characterise the “serious” nature of moral deliberation, i.e. a real-life politician trying to win a parliamentary election experiences more personal and emotional risk than students trying to win the election scenario of The Power Game. At the same time, the lack of real-life consequences in educational games makes it possible to design a relatively safe learning environment, where teachers can stage particular game scenarios to be enacted and validated for educational purposes. In this sense, educational games are able to provide a safe but meaningful way of letting teachers and students make mistakes (e.g. by giving a poor political presentation) and dramatically rehearse particular “competing possible lines of action” that are relevant to particular educational goals (Dewey, 1922: 132). Seen from this pragmatist perspective, the educational value of games is not so much a question of learning facts or giving the “right” answers, but more a question of exploring the contingent outcomes and domain-specific processes of problem-based scenarios.